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Resumen 
En las últimas décadas la concepción de desarrollo ha entrado una fase de de-construcción 
tras recibir un sin número de críticas, así permitiendo nuevos discursos ganar espacio y 
proponer alternativas. El "Buen Vivir" aparece como una alternativa en Ecuador, negando 
al desarrollo como visión inequívoca para los países a seguir y propone la importancia de 
imperativos sociales y ecológicos. La pregunta permanece en sí este nuevo discurso puede 
ser viable como alternativa al desarrollo. Este trabajo contextualiza al "Buen Vivir" como 
un movimiento contra-hegemónico bajo la teoría de Robert Cox y utiliza el caso 
Ecuatoriano como plataforma de análisis para el ámbito local y a priori como posibilidad 
de alternativa al desarrollo en el plano internacional.   
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Abstract 
Development has long been considered as a lineal path to be followed in order to attain 
progress; the foundations from which it emanates are well embedded in western standards. 
For the last decade the conception of development has entered a phase of deconstruction 
after several criticisms, thus allowing new emergent discourses to gain space in different 
ways to attain welfare and growth. The “buen vivir” appears as an alternative in Ecuador, 
which it denies development as an irrevocable action that states pursue and portrays the 
importance of social and ecological imperatives, but the question is can it really replace 
mainstream development theories. This work will contextualize the "buen vivir" as a 
counter-hegemonic movement under Robert Cox's hegemonic theory and use the 
Ecuadorian case to analyze its possibilities to work locally and further on have a place in 
the international arena.   
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Introduction 
The underlying detriments of modern society have set the foundations for criticism, 
but they have also established a subaltern portrayal of society. Consequently, the concept 
of Sumak Kawsay arises in academic debate. Sumak Kawsay is an indigenous guiding 
principle, which has been introduced into the Ecuadorian constitution. This philosophy 
creates an alternative vision of how to develop society.  It is through the work and theory 
of Robert Cox, who based his ideas on the initial writings of Antonio Gramsci on 
hegemony, that I will try to determine if the indigenous “Sumak Kawsay”, currently 
translated into “The Buen Vivir”, is a counter-hegemonic movement to the current 
development approach which serves as a universal trend. Analyzing the case of Ecuador 
will exemplify if such movement can work out locally in order to potentially serve as a 
global alternative.    
This paper will be divided into three main chapters.  The first will introduce Cox‟s 
theoretical framework about the existence and limits of hegemony. The second will 
illustrate the current dominant development paradigm.  The last will analyze the “Buen 
Vivir” as a counter-hegemonic movement in Ecuador. The philosophical roots of the 
“Sumak Kawsay” will not be analyzed on this paper nor will this philosophy be taken as a 
sole theory or concept.  On the contrary, “Sumak Kawsay” will be analyzed as a rambling 
discourse of mixed character produced merely from the outcome of the cultural and 
political interactions that contend hegemony. To contrast the exhibitory challenge of the 
“Buen Vivir” in the Ecuadorian realm, a retaliatory enunciation of what development 
means and its origins will be discussed.  Moreover, it is important to highlight why “Buen 
Vivir” is considered the current and dominant hegemon under Cox‟s theory. Likewise, 
consideration must be given to the theories on “sustainable development” as well as the 
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ecological approaches that launch the BV movement and contribute to the criticism on 
modernity and current development models.        
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Chapter 1 
Robert Cox and Hegemony 
 According to classical International Relations theory, the concept of hegemony is 
rather a narrow view of what a State can do under certain economic and material 
capabilities. In contrast, Robert Cox “broadens the domain of hegemony” towards 
understanding the dominance of one actor over another as the effect of “consensual order 
so that the dominance by a powerful state may be necessary but not a sufficient condition 
of hegemony” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 87).  Introducing hegemony under this underlying 
category of consensus among actors implies the need to understand how social order and 
the values that organize it come to place and are diffused. Taking into account the creation 
of such consensus on a local level sets foundations to later open the possibility of changing 
the level of analysis to the international sphere.  
 Cox emphasizes that actors whose actions create certain circumstances are not the 
sole and most important factor to be understood in International Relations.  Instead, “the 
transformations of main forms of state and how these forms change under pressure from 
above forces (world order) and from below (civil society)” (Unay 2010, 40) must be 
considered. These types of forces seem to mold and adhere to the international sphere. 
Furthermore, they tend to have distinct types of economic activities that might endorse 
new types of organizations, just as the changes that take place due to political deviances 
one state might have with another in its relations.  
Based on the writings of Gramsci, Cox believes the events that took place in 
Western Europe were different from those in Russia.  According to Cox, “the basic 
difference was in the relative strengths of state and civil society. Accordingly, Gramsci 
argued that the war of movement could not be effective against the hegemonic state-
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societies of Western Europe” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 128). Hence, there is evidence that 
forces from above and below tend to establish the limits of hegemony.  Therefore, the state 
cannot be contextualized as the protagonist of supremacy.  Instead, supremacy is the 
unification of social forces from different sides that prepare the arena for the rise of 
hegemony. 
Critical theory envisions the above explanation of how hegemony arises. Unay 
asserts hegemony “does not take the institutions and social power relations for granted. It 
questions the very origins and improvement potential of the existing patterns of interaction, 
focusing on the social and political complex as a whole, rather than its separate and 
fragmented aspects” (Unay 2010, 41). Thus, Robert Cox intends to analyze concepts under 
their own specific historical circumstances, just like Gramsci did under the influence of 
Marxism as a current of thought known as the “philosophy of praxis”.  In this manner, the 
concept of hegemony appears unquestionably constructed on formulations where a state 
must defend an order based on universal conceptions under a continuous dialogical 
movement among participants.  
Andrew Deak‟s The Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance cites 
Cox regarding the possible outcomes for world order and hegemony. First, “the prospect 
for a new hegemony based upon the global structure of social power generated by the 
internationalization of production.” Second, the “non-hegemonic world structure of 
conflicting power centers.” Third, a “counter-hegemony based on a third world coalition 
against core-country dominance” (Deak 2005, 49). The last consideration makes the case 
for the analysis of this paper.  Clearly, the appearance of a counter-hegemonic movement 
from the periphery (Latin America) contrasts a different way of order that is juxtaposed 
with the internationalization of production, the current form of hegemony.     
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The critical theory proposed by Cox is neither static nor procedural, but it is a broad 
domain of differentiated contexts, in which hegemony cannot stand unless there is 
consensus. The origins of this concept relate to a Machiavellian understanding of power. 
For example, “where Machiavelli looked to the individual prince, Gramsci looked to the 
modern prince; the revolutionary party engaged in a continuing and developing dialogue 
with its own base of support. Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a 
centaur: half man, half beast” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 127). Hence, by shared interest 
among the individuals of a system, the continuous dialogue that constructs this universal 
conception of order is confined to a consensual aspect of power, where consent and 
coercion are two sides of the same coin.     
As mentioned earlier, Gramsci contends that a war of movement could not be 
resolved against hegemonic states of Western Europe. To differentiate contexts among one 
society and another, Gramsci distinguished two types of societies: “One kind had 
undergone a thorough social revolution and worked out fully its consequences in new 
modes of production and social relations. The other kind included societies which had 
adopted aspects of a new order created abroad, without the old order being displaced” (Cox 
and Sinclair 1983, 129). This was for Gramsci the underlying reason why one society or 
another could undergo a revolution of change, or what he later called “the passive 
revolution”.  
The societies that had not undergone a thorough revolution and were left with a 
“new industrial bourgeoisie” were unsuccessful in achieving hegemony (Cox and Sinclair 
1984, 129). Thus, Gramsci stated that the failure to stir up popular forces gave rise to what 
he called the “passive revolution” (Ibidem). According to Cox, building alternatives 
creates a force within the current hegemon and extricates the “pressures and temptations to 
relapse into pursuit of incremental gains for subaltern groups”, thus construing a counter-
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hegemonic movement. The concept of passive revolution “is counterpart to the concept of 
hegemony in that it describes the condition of a non-hegemonic society” (Cox and Sinclair 
1983, 130). Example of this can be countries of Latin America that have adopted 
developmental policies from the north and which in turn have not created the desired 
effects.   
Andrew Deak describes a term known as crisis in hegemony, which was initially coined by 
Stephen Gill.  He asserts “there are specific instances where a form of passive revolution, 
which is a component of hegemonic crisis, is directly linked to counter-hegemonic 
movements, and that there is in fact a certain dynamism or dialectic relationship between 
the two moments” (Deak 2005, 50). Formidably hegemonic actors, at an international or 
local level, enter a crisis due to a loss of consent among them.  Hence, “persuasive ideas 
and arguments build on and catalyze its political networks and organization” (Özcelik 
2005, 101). Therefore, a passive revolution not only indicates the inexistence of popular 
forces that forge changes in power but also the potentiality of construing movements that 
will seek to change the status quo of the hegemon. “When consent or legitimacy of an 
ethical hegemony is lost, the subaltern groups become discontented. The conditions would 
be ripe for a legitimate and popular challenge the social order that had marginalized them” 
(Deak 2005, 50). Thus, counter-hegemony appears unto losses of consent and legitimacy 
of the hegemon. 
Gramsci builds on the concept of Caesarism as an element that belongs to a passive 
revolution.  Caesarism takes place when “a strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate 
between equal and opposed social forces” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 129).  In the same line, 
the author distinguishes between two types of Caesarism: reactionary and progressive. The 
former involves a ruler that stabilizes the existing power, while the latter responds to a 
“strong rule [which] presides over a more orderly development of a new state” (Ibidem). In 
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Production, Power, and World Order, Cox points out that Ceasarsim does not need to be 
in the form of Thatcherism, for example, but can potentially be a “caesarism without a 
Caesar” (Deak 2005, 48).   
 
 
Transformismo is a second element that is a crucial point to the Hegemonic theory. 
Transformismo “worked to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern social groups. By 
extension transformismo can serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating 
potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and 
can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to established 
social and political power” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 130). According to Cox and Sinclair, 
the intellectual and elite talents that exist in the countries of the periphery, and, which 
could pose a threat, are reabsorbed.  Thus, these countries can no longer pose any future 
threat to the consistency of the hegemonic order.  
Cox refers to hegemony as a pillow because it takes in impact and eventually 
becomes a comfortable place for the “ would-be assailant to rest upon”.  Similarly, 
“transformismo absorbs potentially counter hegemonic ideas and makes these ideas 
consistent with hegemonic doctrine” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 139). Thus, there is a 
reasonable difference among hegemonic and non-hegemonic movements. Özcelik states, 
“hegemonic structures are distinguished from non-hegemonic inasmuch as those in control 
of institutions do not predominately resort to the use of force. The consent is strengthened 
if the controllers make concessions to the dominated and express their relationship in terms 
of universal general interest” (Özcelik 2005, 100). Therefore, transformismo is a 
fundamental tool to express and maintain hegemony.  
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Gramsci builds on the term of “social myth” to explain the consistency of 
hegemonic powers and the existence of a “Blocco Historico” or Historic Bloc.  According 
to Sorel, who coined the term of “social myth”, the interpretation of revolutionary action 
must be done in terms of social myths “through which people engaged in action perceived 
a confrontation of totalities- in which they saw a new order challenging an established 
order” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 131). In other words, the social myth served as a powerful 
source of collective subjectivity that bars any form of restructuring within the hegemon. 
An example of this can be development as a “powerful myth: full of glowing and 
apparently praise worthy ideas, both desirable and even necessary” (Prada 2011, 147), all 
this is can be taken as a series of indicators or goals such as industrialization, progress, 
economic wellbeing etc.  
Robert Cox argues “the creation of a world order is result of hegemon and the formation of 
a historic bloc. A historic bloc is organized around a set of ideas- a dominant ideology- that 
forms the basis for an alliance of social classes”. The author contends that hegemony must 
be consolidated in such way that it escapes co-optation by transformismo, unity and 
coherence within the hegemon is a determinant factor.  Therefore, the sociopolitical order 
must be created under a general conceptualization of order, where interests of potential 
“game changers” are co-opted into the system. When there is no sense of this order and the 
interests of important actors are not accounted for, a possibility of “a new hegemonic bloc 
is formed when a subordinate class (e.g., the workers) establishes its hegemony over the 
subordinate group” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 132). The last mentioned mandates a 
dialogical process between leaders and followers.  
The term “class” appears to be an important aspect to the theory of hegemony. Cox 
proposes, “hegemony [must be] understood as a form of class rule linked to social forces, 
as the core collective actors engendered by the social relations of production” (Bieler and 
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Morton 2004, 89). In the same way, class appears to be a category that remits itself to its 
historical significance and even more to the identity forged under the process of economic 
exploitation. Therefore, “changes in social relations of production give rise to new 
configurations of social forces. State power rests on these configurations” (Bieler and 
Morton 2004, 90). Bieler and Morton support Cox‟s premise by asserting that the “patterns 
of production relations are the starting point for analyzing the operation and mechanism of 
hegemony”.  In accordance to this principle, production is taken as a whole, not only as the 
production of commodities but also as the reproduction of knowledge, social relations, 
morals, and the institutions that guarantee such production.   
 Consequently, the Historic Bloc is a representation of a diversity of interests that 
find their way through society.  As mentioned before, the Historic Bloc not only entails an 
economic character but an intellectual and moral as well. This leads to the importance of 
what Gramsci called intellectuals and their role inside the Historic Bloc. Cox explains, 
“intellectuals play a key role in the building of a historic bloc. Gramsci saw them as 
organically connected to the social class. They perform the function of developing and 
sustaining the mental images, technologies, and organization, which bind together the 
members of a class and of an historic bloc into a common identity”.  Political parties can 
perform this role such as in the case of Caesarism. Clearly, there is no need of 
Thatcherism, but there is a need for a “Collective Intellectual” to bind together the identity 
of the Historic Bloc.  
A Historic Bloc cannot be conceived without a leading social class because it 
maintains cohesion and identity under a common culture. Regarding the creation of blocs 
and new hegemonies, Gramsci distinguished three levels of consciousness that lead to a 
common culture that spreads coherence and unity. The first level is the economic 
corporative that is aware of the specific interests of a particular group.  The second level is 
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the solidarity of class-consciousness.  Finally, the last level is the hegemonic which brings 
the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes, thereby 
incorporating these interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms (Cox and 
Sinclair 1983, 133).  
Having established the origins of hegemony, critical theory foresees different 
contexts for the elaboration of power and social relations. It claims that material 
capabilities and economic resources are not the sole factors to be taken into consideration. 
Societies differ from one another to the extent of their passive or non-passive internal 
revolutions.  This societal difference and the rise of a Historical Bloc or the co-optation 
through transformismo create a counter hegemonic movement. In the differentiation of 
non-hegemonic and hegemonic movements, social class is exclusive to establish 
hegemony. A propagation of a common culture that consolidates a same identity for the 
generality of actors cannot be attained without social class.  Moreover, the modes of 
production, which encompass economic activity and the morals and values that justify it, 
must be taken into account when formulating a counter-hegemonic movement.  
To propose a counter-hegemonic movement, it is crucial to understand Cox‟s 
theory of a hegemon. Cox maintains, “the hegemonic concept of world order is founded 
not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil 
society, i.e., a mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social 
classes of the countries encompassed by it” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 136). This mode of 
production is currently formulated by capitalism and development.  Therefore, any form of 
contestation must find itself under a “globally conceived civil society” which not only sets 
a revolution that changes the economic precedent inside a state, but also has the energy to 
exhibit itself outside of state boundaries. Cox affirms, “hegemony at the international level 
is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a 
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dominant mode of production” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 137). Such mode of production 
perpetrates itself within all countries and defines any other form or mode of production. 
Counter-hegemony would then have to encompass a large spectrum to pose a 
threat. Moreover, “building upon the Gramscian notion of hegemony, Cox contends that to 
become truly hegemonic, a state would have to establish and protect a world order which is 
universal in conception” (Unay 2010, 42).  In contrast, Özcelik cites Gill and Law‟s The 
Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies and establishes that the 
“Coxian understanding of hegemony implies the necessity of global structural change and 
world order in terms of “the dynamics and dialectics of their normative (ethical, 
ideological, practical), as well as their material dimensions” (Özcelik 2005, 101). Counter-
hegemony then would appear under a power spectrum where soft power that concentrates 
under a discourse and ideas has to be reinforced by hard power, or the material dimension 
as mentioned before.  
In accordance to Cox and the prospects for counter-hegemony, it is vital to 
understand that “the national context remains the only place where an historic bloc can be 
founded, although world-economic and world-political conditions materially influence the 
prospects for such an enterprise” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 140).  Likewise, any change in 
world order circumscribes a shift from international institutions to national societies.  Cox 
believes the state is constituted from the “condensation of a hegemonic relationship 
between dominant classes and class fractions” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 92).  Additionally, 
hegemony is consolidated from structure to the “sphere of the complex superstructures” 
(Cox and Sinclair 1983, 133). This means a state is formed from the constitution of 
specific interests of a particular group into ideologies and institutions. Similarly, Bieler and 
Morton claim the “state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with 
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains dominance, but manages to win the 
19 
 
active consent of those over whom it rules” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 92).  Further on, 
consolidating counter-hegemony on a local level is the only way to unleash forces to other 
parts of the system.  
Gramsci also mentions the importance of the concept of “organic” in the construction of a 
counter-hegemonic movement.  In this way, “those ideas that organize human masses and 
create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, 
etc., [and] are contrasted with ideas that are merely arbitrary, rationalistic, willed, based on 
extemporary polemics” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 92).  In addition, Andrew Deak 
contributes by saying “if hegemony is based on consent and effective inclusion of 
subaltern groups, then counter-hegemony would emerge from the contradictions of a non-
hegemonic period” (Deak 2005, 50).  The supremacy of organic ideas over other arbitrary 
ones marks a position that allows hegemony to persist and to consolidate an effective 
Historic Bloc. Cox concludes that if these “ideas reflect a hegemony, these institutions and 
ideologies will be universal” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 133). This means that ideas will not 
be regarded as those of a particular sector, but legitimized under the fact that many actors 
join this same idea. Subordinate groups will only follow the lead of other groups if they 
find a sense of shared interests and representation. 
Under this theoretical framework of hegemony, it is possible to analyze the 
discourses of “Development” and “Buen Vivir”.  Moreover, it will also be possible to 
estimate the current state of development and the extent from which the Buen Vivir can 
posit a real counter-hegemonic position. The historical process from which development 
arises after WWII sets the foundations for the current economic, social, and political 
models of modern states.  On the contrary, the Buen Vivir appears as a local “hegemonic 
project” which moves beyond specific economic interests and has the capacity of uniting 
different aspirations and interests of transnational and local movements.  
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The real question is whether the Buen Vivir is an alternative to development under 
Cox‟s hegemonic theory or can it just be considered a discourse co-opted by 
transformismo to maintain the current hegemonic status. The next chapter will discuss 
development in a historical perspective and its process towards current debates under the 
theoretical framework discussed above. Additionally, the chapter will also discuss how 
various critiques serve as foundation for the appearance of the Buen Vivir discourse.  
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Chapter 2 
Development as a Discourse and Hegemonic Apparatus  
 Truman‟s “Point Four” speech in 1949 established a sense of “development”. This 
concept of development fostered the “maturity” of certain nations that were motivated to 
adopt this new idea.  In Truman‟s speech, the fourth point is the most remarkable: “we 
must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement of growth of underdeveloped areas” (Rist 
2010, 71).  After WWII, Truman‟s vision confirmed that it was necessary to analyze the 
challenges other countries faced and aid these countries to achieve a “sustainable path to 
industrialization” (Rapley 2007, 1). A new way of seeing state objectives and what was 
considered desirable for society as a whole had been put into action.  As a result, nations 
became more focused in eliminating underdevelopment.  
Until this moment, colonialism had perpetrated the relations among what was 
considered colonizer and colonized nations. 
Until then, North-South relations had been organized largely in accordance with the 
colonizer/colonized opposition. The new developed/underdeveloped dichotomy proposed a different 
relationship, which conformed with the new declaration of human rights and the progressive 
globalization of the system of states (Rist 2010, 73).  
Under this notion, states gained political independence, unattained in the past, but had to 
posit themselves as developing nations. That is, they had to seek development to gain 
mutual respect among nations. Rapley asserts, “African and Asian countries came to 
independence poor, and were eager for two reasons to speed up their development. One 
was the obvious fact they sought to provide better lives for their citizens. The second was 
the obvious need to consolidate their independence” (Rapley 2007, 2).   This can be 
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equally compared to countries of South America, which sought development for the same 
reasons.  
The declaration of human rights and the guidelines of political and cultural 
characters that include international and multilateral organizations marked the ambience 
for states to evolve in a manner that established homogeneity among them. Hence, Andre 
Gunder Frank examines development as “a policy that comes from the historical 
experience of the European and North American advanced capital nations” (Frank 2007, 
76). Under Cox‟s theory, strong capitalist nations that establish hegemony under a 
capitalist mode of production rely on development theories to maintain an order within the 
state system. Thus, the formation of a Historic Bloc comes to existence.   
Several considerations take ground and assert a number of critiques at how 
development is overall structured. The first of these parameters refers to the 
characterization of individual freedom and the maximization of individual potential, where 
development strategies cannot grasp individual considerations due to the different contexts 
in which individuals evolve. According to Rist, development refers to individual 
experiences that cannot be understood by external characteristics.  Therefore discussing 
individual potential and the broadening of individual choices will not help us reach a 
definition of development (Rist 2010, 9). The second major flaw regarding the definition 
of development is that it is constructed from the vision of one person or nation. 
Consequently, the concept of development dwells between two main positions. One stance 
“as the expression of a wish to live a better life, which seems deliberately to ignore the fact 
that the concrete ways of achieving it would run up against conflicting political choices, 
and two the great mass of actions which are supposed eventually to bring greater 
happiness” (Rist 2010, 11). Under these critiques, development can hardly formulate an 
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effective plan that can be equally applied among actors, due to the distinct historical 
background that each ones is circumscribed to.  
Before continuing on the elaboration of a critique on the hegemon development 
current, Emmanuel Wallerstein makes some important points to understand the current 
hegemonic status of development through the capitalist structure among nations. As 
mentioned before, the development model is taken from a European and North American 
experience that began at the time of the industrial revolution.  This model “defined this 
change as both process of organic development and of progress” (Wallerstein 1979, 95). 
Wallerstein believes the existence of stages, reinforced by the idea of progress due to an 
industrial revolution, is nothing more than to talk about stages of a social system or 
totality. Furthermore, the only totality are “minisystems and a world-system, and in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the 
capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein 1979, 97). Hence, the capitalist world economy 
has been the dominant mode of production, from which development has fostered its core 
arguments.  
To further explain, minisystems are considered as a complete division of labor with 
a single cultural framework such as an agricultural society. However, a world-system is 
recognized as a single division of labor among multiple cultural levels, which may or not 
have a common political denominator such as empires or a world economy. Under Cox‟s 
analysis, Wallerstein asserts that the representation of diversity of interests can be found in 
a Historic Bloc or in a World System. This was the case during the industrial revolution.  
The capitalist countries of the north concluded that the sociopolitical order and coherence 
of the structure was based on how actors sought to adhere to the capitalist canons of 
production.  
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Wallerstein also introduces the concepts of Core, Periphery, and Semi- Periphery to 
refer to the existence of a capitalist world economy and how it maintains its hegemony 
among distinct actors. According to him, there are “three major mechanisms that have 
enabled world-systems to retain political stability: one obviously is a concentration of 
military strength in hands of the dominant forces, the pervasiveness of an ideological 
commitment to the system as a whole” (Wallerstein 1979, 105). Wallerstein‟s concepts can 
be juxtaposed with the concept of Hegemony and the Machiavellian perspective that rules 
by coercion and consent, which are two sides of the same coin (power). Consequently, this 
coercion and consent confirm the belief “it is generally held that economic development 
occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today‟s underdeveloped countries are 
still in a stage sometimes depicted as an original stage of history, through which the now 
developed countries passed years ago” (Frank 2007, 76). This is a critique to the initial 
development concept proposed by Rostow where the “Buen Vivir” discourse will only 
reaffirm the criticism constructed over the last 20. What is new that it will try to create a 
new a platform of argumentation to review this linear process based on new ways of seeing 
society as a whole.  
Even though much has changed since the initial belief that countries must perform 
linear activity, the center platform Cox adheres to as patterns of production, which are the 
starting point for hegemony, remain untouched. Peter Evans‟s text Counterhegemonic 
Globalization asserts the following: 
Despite its failures, few would deny that neoliberal globalization remains hegemonic in the 
Gramscian sense of combining ideological vision of what is everyone‟s interest that is largely 
accepted as common sense even by subordinate and disprivileged groups with the effective ability to 
apply coercion when necessary to preserve the existing distribution of privilege and exclusion 
(Evans 2005, 422).   
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Later, the author mentions that any counter-hegemonic movement must have the potential 
to undermine “ideological power of existing hegemony and threaten the established 
distribution of privilege” (Ibidem). It is come clear that changes in hegemony would arise 
from a change in how ideological and material relations take place. Counter-hegemony 
then is based on a change of mode of production and the values and interest that propagate 
such production.   
From the days of colonial conquest, relations among nations were depicted from a 
developed and underdeveloped notion. Thus, the concept of development was defined in a 
system that portrayed a hegemonic role of capitalist countries.  This was emphasized by 
Wallerstein‟ dependency theory in which he delineates the countries that are part of a Core, 
Periphery, and Semi periphery.  This form of organization permitted the existence and 
longevity of the current Historic Bloc. The search for this form of development by 
peripheral countries follows the idea discussed in Cox‟s chapter on George Sorel‟s 
appreciation of a Social Myth, in which progress and development must occur at all costs, 
and the concept perse is a product of a one-sided vision of reality (European Modernity).  
The presence of intermediary nations, which do not fall into a categorization of 
developed or developing, justify the existence of the whole structure.  Wallerstein believes 
that to make sense of the structural differences of core and periphery, it is implicit to be 
aware of the semi periphery, a third structural position, needed for the success of a 
capitalist economy (Wallerstein 1979, 105). This intermediate position constantly 
pressures nations to acquire a cultural homogenization. As Wallerstein claims, “the 
existence of a third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the 
unified opposition of all the other because the middle stratum is both exploited and 
exploiter”(Wallerstein 1979, 106).  Similarly, when Cox defines the term of passive 
revolution, he mentions that the functioning of the capitalist world system depends on 
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nations, and “this effect comes when the impetus to change does not arise out of a vast 
local development” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 134). On the contrary, it is the diffusion of 
ideology from the core to the periphery based on premises of international developments 
what defines the capitalist world system.  
The United States as a Hegemon 
To fully understand the causes of development discourse under a capitalist 
hegemonic system, it becomes useful to understand the role of the United States as a 
former hegemon. Under the rise of a new dichotomy based on universal values, the old 
colonial empire saw its demise, but only on grounds of political influence, because the gap 
that separated these same nations remained the same. Gilbert Rist contributes to this 
argument by claiming, “decolonization may be seen as the price that France, Belgium and 
Britain had to pay for the US involvement in the WWII”. To this extent, the 
“development/underdevelopment couplet maintained a gap between different parts of the 
world, but justified the possibility- or the necessity- of intervention on the grounds that one 
cannot remain passive when one is confronted with extreme need” (Rist 2010, 76).  This 
new concept of intervention, based on the need to confront economic needs, put forth 
development as the Holy Grail of politics, which further promoted becoming rich and 
prosperous.  
 In accordance with Cox‟s views, the concept of hegemony relates not only to the 
role of states and the relations among them but to other actors as well. Cox argues that the 
“regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, i.e., a 
mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social classes” (Cox 
and Sinclair 1983, 136) is also important. The United States proved that the strongest 
indicator to determine the wealth of a nation is gross domestic product. Along similar 
lines, Rist emphasizes that the US finally “asserted its hegemony by means of a generous 
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proposal that claimed to be beyond the ideological divide between capitalism and 
communism. The key to prosperity and happiness was increased production, not endless 
debate about the organization of a society” (Rist 2010, 76). The ideological commitment 
among states to attain prosperity through increased production set forward the possibility 
for industrialized states to become a model to be pursued by the rest.  
The common link among nations was that of production.  Currently, this link 
remains the same.  Wallerstein claims that marketable production is the most important 
aspect in a capitalist world-economy. The main objective of this type of economy is to 
maximize profit.  As long as production remains profitable, production will increase 
(Wallerstein 1979, 101).  Clearly, development is the key concept for nations to acquire 
such profit because “development is a state characterized by affluence, by wealth that 
keeps growing and is never exhausted, by resources that have only to be mobilized and 
brought into play”(Rist 2010, 76).  Consequently, the terms of “development policy” are 
evaluated according to the notions of growth and aid as the solutions.  This was cherished 
when “first world donor agencies began pressuring third-world governments to make 
similar changes in their policies (attack on the state).  Thus, many third world governments 
acceded reluctantly” (Rapley 2007, 3).  Moreover, the rapid influence of international 
organizations in countries of the periphery justified the hegemonic presence of the 
capitalist mode of production on the countries of the north. 
In accordance with Cox, international organizations aid in conveying the norms of a 
world-hegemony. Zadik Unay contributes to the last stated and asserts that international 
organizations facilitate “the expansion of dominant economic and social forces” (Unay 
2010, 42).  Therefore, it is no surprise that international institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF had a leading role for the reconstruction and development of nations 
after the end of WWII.  Furthermore, they promoted universal values of human dignity and 
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liberty under the premise of development for nations. It was not until the appearance of 
post-development theories, that development theory was “charged with being unconcerned 
about prosperity; rather, it was said to be geared toward establishing external control over 
citizen‟s lives” (Rapley 2007, 4). Development had lost legitimacy among actors where its 
objectives no longer where highly shared and international organizations had to 
reformulate their strategies.   
Andre Gunder Frank acknowledges that development cannot have a universal 
character.  Applying solutions to foster development circumscribes more than general 
measures.  Gunder Frank claims, “we cannot hope to formulate adequate development 
theory and policy for the majority of the world‟s population who suffer from 
underdevelopment without first learning how their past economic and social history gave 
rise to their present underdevelopment” (Frank 2007, 1). For example, the economic crisis 
originated in Asian nations in the years 1997-1998 had as protagonists the IMF and the US 
treasury department.  These organizations “exploited moments of weakness in the East 
Asian governments to force upon those nations a neoclassical theory…here was never a 
developmental-state model as such, but simply variants of a common theme that seemed 
peculiar” (Rapley 2007, 5).  Consequently, the immersion of external actors guiding the 
development process was now firmly questioned. The development model had now 
entered a phase of revaluation.  
The erosion of the development model serves as example of how fostering 
capitalism many times created an evil in itself. Frank concludes “underdevelopment is not 
due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions 
that remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, 
underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process that also 
generated economic development” (Frank 2007, 80). According to Gill, the crisis in 
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hegemony does not demonstrate “a decline in US power, but instead [it is] marked by 
transformations of the structures of power” (Deak 2005, 50). These transformations 
circumscribe the scenery for new actors to challenge the established order.  These actors 
either produce a radical change in the social relations of production or shift the balance of 
power.  Rapley states the following: 
Scholarly opinion around needs of both people and poor countries, away from programmatic 
commitments to better governments occurred when the shift of power among poor and rich 
countries changed: a) rise of China and India- in which in hand expanded globe‟s manufacturing 
capacity” (Rapley 2007, 8).  
The last mentioned resonates as a shift in the power relations of the hegemonic order, 
where new actors through a change of modes of production seek to change how 
development was being conceived.  
As new actors set the foundations to achieve development and the problems in the 
periphery worsened, it seemed a possibility for development “to bounce back via the new 
Western fashion of ecology”.  Because nations had undergone major structural 
adjustments, sustainable development saw its perfect timing. Moreover, sustainable 
development seemed to be the perfect solution considering “industrial 
development…consumed more resources than it generated, a waste exacerbated by 
inefficient states (Third world economies growing more slowly than required to meet the 
needs of citizens)” (Rapley 2007, 3). Thus, the destruction of natural resources due to rapid 
industrialization could now be transformed into desirable and marketable products.  In this 
way, contamination was reduced through recycling incentives.    
This new vision did not take for granted the way states tended to economically 
grow, but focused on a dual vision of “poor” and “rich” nations and how their actions 
affected the environment. With this advocacy for change came several transnational 
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movements and through their international agenda pressured to obtain different results in 
regards to how development was conceived.  For Gilbert Rist, this concept  
Meant reconciling two opposite concepts: for on the one hand, it was precisely human activities- 
especially those stemming from the mode of industrial production synonymous with 
development…and on the other hand, it seemed inconceivable not to hasten the “development” of 
peoples which did not yet have access to decent living conditions (Rist 2010, 180).   
The consideration of any form of production entailing a form of destruction, as well as the 
failed development strategy of obtaining industrialization at any cost served as platform to 
create sustainable development.  
Development took a human perspective.  Prosperity and growth were not the 
ultimate goals.  For development to have a more complete perspective, it needed to include 
ecological concerns and the welfare of future generations.  Cox‟s theory contends 
development has shifted in its discourse, but the modes of production and relation have 
remained the same.  In addition, the capitalist driven structure has co-opted many of the 
ecologist, feminist, and other movements that have pressured for changes within the 
system. In conclusion, modernity is heavily criticized due to its unsustainable practices.  
Therefore, new concepts such as the Buen Vivir are worth revising and examining for their 
possible counter hegemonic positions and plans of action.  
From its starting point, development policy has aimed to set similar standards and 
goals among states. On the contrary, underdevelopment equates to everything undesirable, 
as nations had ceased to even consider it as a possibility.  To support this view Rist 
confirms “from 1949 onwards, often without realizing it, more than two billion inhabitants 
of the planet found themselves changing their name, being “officially” regarded as they 
appeared in the eyes of others, called upon to deepen their westernization by repudiating 
their values” (Rist 2010, 79). It is clear, movements against globalization evoke their 
historical and national character to reevaluate the premises of modernity and evoke the 
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possibility of a distinct society based on different values. The Buen Vivir, as a criticism to 
modernity and the need for a new perspective on development, aid Cox‟s view to create 
within national boundaries a counter- hegemonic movement.  
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Chapter 3 
From Development to the Buen Vivir 
The needs for alternatives regarding development to mitigate criticism have 
leveraged grassroots movements around the globe. In particular, the Buen Vivir discourse 
based on the Sumak Kawsay indigenous cosmovision and its political ideals have marked a 
new perspective. The inclusion of indigenous political movements in 21
st
 century politics 
have given rise to several questions regarding the concept of development.   However, the 
problem with development is the following contradiction:   “on the one hand, the policies 
described as development by the state and the international aid community, which have 
had negative impact; and on the other, the indigenous cosmovision of co-existence with 
nature as a new view of development” (Prada 2011, 145). Development under the Buen 
Vivir discourse can no longer set nature as the tool to obtain progress, but it now resides as 
an entity with equal rights that cannot be exploited freely.  
Throughout the last chapter, it is clear that development in accordance with western 
canons has sought to mark and cherish how states must accomplish progress and growth. 
In the same line, in accordance to development critiques, this model has also limited the 
way in which individuals lead their lives. For Walsh, it is “paradogmatic” in the sense that 
it is a “frame against which the Global south in general and Latin America in particular 
have both measured themselves and been measured. It is the developed west against and, at 
the same time, the model for the rest” (Walsh 2010, 15). Therefore, the inclusion of an 
indigenous cosmovision into the constitution of a nation (Latin American or from the 
south) becomes a decolonizing act. This to the extent that for the first time indigenous 
values and elevating nature to a subject with rights is taken into account when creating the 
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Magna Carte. This does not guarantee that the Buen Vivir will be practiced effectively; 
there is still much distance between theoretical considerations and praxis.  
To acquire a non-western vision of society and a re-arrangement of the state based 
on indigenous values is, indeed, an act that breaks precedents on how countries can obtain 
responsible growth and a broad perspective on citizenship. The corollary follows the 
premise that states base themselves on traditional economics, which in turn “Teaches us 
that growth is good. It promises more jobs, more consumption and more satisfaction of 
personal needs” (Thomson 2011, 448). But its plausibility as a determinant factor to 
engender prosperity has its limits, especially when “unlimited economic growth has 
brought us to the brink of the closely related financial and climate crisis” (Ibidem). Hence, 
Sumak Kawsay proposes a different concept. Whether its original definition transmutes 
into the “Buen Vivir” discourse or not, what comes relevant is how the latter can contest a 
change. This change addressed unto the erosion of both development policy and modernity 
vision as the main vector of ideology. 
Emergence into the Political Sphere 
 From the year 1949 with the recent end of WWII and the beginning of the 
economic restructuration of Europe, there was an “official” change of distinctiveness in 
nationalities. Western Develop mentalism from that point on started to establish a change 
if not a loss of identity of individuals who were not able to assimilate into the develop 
mentalism mode.  Severine Deneulin in her text the “Contribution of Latin American Buen 
Vivir social movements to the idea of justice” cites Deborah Yashar and finds a parallel 
significance of appearance for the indigenous movements around the same decade.  Yashar 
“situates the roots of indigenous mobilization today in the 1950s and 1960s, when states 
enable people to mobilize among class lines and incorporate interests. Indigenous peoples 
started to organize in peasant federations to represent their group interests” (Deneulin, 
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2012, 4). Yashar also mentions how neo-liberal citizenship government “gave already 
organized peasant organizations the freedom to come together no longer as peasant but as 
indigenous” (Ibidem). This allowed indigenous people to group themselves in political 
movements in the beginning of the 90s decade.  
To make a recount of official indigenous political movements that have gained influence in 
Latin America is to speak about the “communities self-organized at the national level in 
the case of Ecuador (CONAIE, since 1986, or CIDOB, since 1982) and, more recently, at 
the regional level (CAOI, since 2006).  These communities have become essential political 
actors in the process of renewed state building” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 56). The 
contextualization to evaluate the emergence of the indigenous grassroots is to reconsider, 
as posited before, the extent to which development policy and modernity ideology have 
eroded relations within states and among states. Therefore, “the emergence of these 
indigenous voices result from the empowerment of indigenous communities in the Andean 
countries, but also from the affinity of their worldviews with those of different national 
NGO‟s and global contemporary social movements” (Ibidem). The internal struggle that 
most of the indigenous movements carry out seem to be assisted by transnational 
movements that share some of the same interests, such as land preservation.    
This erosion was a direct result of how “Latin American countries undertook 
drastic economic liberal reforms. The overall share of the extractive industry in the 
economy grew significantly. Indigenous people were particularly affected as they lived on 
resource rich land, which agro-business and mining companies were coveting” (Deneulin 
2012, 4). This served as a platform for the consolidation and contestation of indigenous 
movements.  They soon gained political influence and marked a change in how to 
elaborate the political agenda of South American countries.  It was now necessary to 
broaden the domain of political discourse and reach the large fraction of society that felt 
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unprotected. This political emergence established a local and regional revolution.  In the 
same way, Cox‟s framework claims that any change in the hegemonic order must pass 
from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 133). 
Hence, indigenous movements should seek to elaborate ideologies and build institutions.  
According to Vanhulst and Beling, this political mêlée of indigenous movements 
“came to participate- driven by their particular recognition struggles- in the global debate 
around sustainability and development”. In the same context, the authors establish that the 
Buen Vivir discourse “started gaining importance in Ecuador and Bolivia- two countries 
whose populations are mostly of indigenous origin and strongly identify with their 
ancestral traditions- to the point of becoming a central reference for the new National 
Constitutions” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 56).  Similarly, Walsh believes that 
incorporating these indigenous values in the constitution is historically significant.  
Therefore, “in a country (Ecuador) that has long exalted its mestizo character, favored 
whitening and whiteness, and looked to the North for its model of development, the 
incorporation of buen vivir as the guiding principle of the constitution is historically 
significant” (Walsh 2010, 18).  To the last mentioned, it is clear that it is an unprecedented 
moment because interests of a segment of the population that had never been taken into 
account are now to be the guiding principles of the society.  
The Sumak Kawsay 
 The Sumak Kawsay seeks to accomplish equilibrium between the human being and 
nature. Prada explains that “For indigenous and Andean people, expresses a sense of 
satisfaction in achieving the idea of the community by feeding and nourishing itself 
through its own production. Not just nutrition in the sense of food consumption, but 
through the equilibrium between the living forces of Nature and the commonwealth of the 
community” (Prada 2011, 146). However, it is important to take into consideration that 
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throughout the vast territory of Latin America and its various ethnical segments, the 
concept of Sumak Kawsay varies from one place to another. Thomson asserts that the 
definition of the concept is based on a plurality of vision, where at “risk of simplification, 
proponents of indigenous cosmovisions such as „sumak kawsay‟ is centered in indigenous 
communities, which have resisted colonization for centuries” (Thomson 2011, 449). This 
resistance has been possible only through protecting cultural and historical memories and 
establishing alternative ways of living in society.   
Severine Deneulin claims that this ancient cosmovision does in fact share several 
common points with different communities in Latin America.  Thus, it is possible to 
construct a unified perception.  First, Severine Deneulin believes “to live well is not a 
linear progression into the future but an ongoing process always making, done and undone 
[where] social improvement is a category in permanent construction”. Second, the 
importance of nature as a subject of rights is fundamental because “to live well is to relate 
to nature as a subject which encompasses human life. This entails that all economic and 
social objectives have to be subordinated to the well-functioning of ecosystems”. Third, 
harmony among people will enable humans to live with dignity.  Fourth, “buen vivir does 
not separate the material from the spiritual dimension of life” because the existence of a 
spiritual world is always present. Fifth, “manifestations of good living are specific to a 
particular culture, language, history and social, political and ecological context”. Last, this 
indigenous cosmovision “is a way of life in construction”, to the extent where there is no 
unique way of seeing life (Deneulin 2012, 3).  
 The detailed explanation of the “Buen Vivir” and its Sumak Kawsay roots are 
implicit to generate the current discourse. According to Vanhulst and Beling  
Attention currently captured by BV is the result of a double process of its emancipation from its 
original cosmological framework and of its academic and political reelaboration, which makes of 
37 
 
BV a contemporary discourse and places it within the worldview flow of discursive interactions 
around the imperative of sustainability and the idea of development (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 56).  
This cosmological framework does not resonate into the objective of this paper.  Instead, it 
emphasizes that the discursive field of Buen Vivir can represent both a counter- hegemonic 
movement to development and a capitalist paradigm.    
Radcliffe states “while SK origin lies in the political-cultural concerns of Ecuador‟s 
indigenous movements, as a development model it reflects the outcomes for grassroots 
„insurgent‟ alternatives in the political and economic realities of post neoliberal 
governmentality” (Radcliffe 2011, 241). Walsh further claims that Buen Vivir as a public 
policy “is the result largely of the social, political, and epistemic agency of the indigenous 
movement over the last two decades”.  Furthermore, its character is based on the “urgency 
of radically different social contract that presents alternatives to capitalism and the culture 
of death of its neo-liberal and development project” (Walsh 2011, 18). Clearly, the 
“concept of Sumak Kawsay represents a radical „new paradigm‟ of development that 
initiates a series of socioeconomic transformations including post neoliberalism, popular 
capitalism and, eventually „socialism of sumak kawsay” (Radcliffe 2011, 241). Here it 
becomes clear that the initial principles of the sumak kawsay become diffused unto 
different connotations such as popular capitalism and socialism, which falls far away from 
its initial ethos.  
The Buen Vivir and the Ecuadorian Case 
 Vanhulst and Beling view the buen vivir as the guiding principle for Movimiento 
Alianza PAIS‟ political platform.  This political agenda “articulates the struggle for social 
justice, equality and the abolition of privileges, with the construction of a society that 
respects diversity and nature” (Beling and Vanhulst 20014, 57).  To exemplify and mark 
the course of the Buen Vivir discursive field in Ecuadorian politics, it is worth mentioning 
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the important events that led to its governmentality in the constitution and its realm of 
action. Radcliffe points out how “antineoliberal electoral victory led to putative 
postneoliberal macroeconomics, as well as social movement input into constitutional 
change and social policy formulation, and in turn how these translated into an emergent 
post neoliberal governmentality” (Radcliffe 2011, 243).  This moment was perfect for the 
unification of distinct members of society that looked for the same changes, in this way the 
creation of counter-hegemony became an easier task. 
Furthermore, Vanhulst and Beling determine there are three main factors that 
contribute to the emergence of the Buen Vivir discourse in the last four decades. These 
factors include “the Latin American social movements of the time, the convergence 
between the said movements and the ideologies of certain global movements, and the 
widespread disenchantment with the idea of development” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 56).  
Prada points out that in order to build a new view of society two levels in the Buen Vivir 
need clarification: experience and practice as well as ethics and politics.  According to 
Prada, it is impossible to come up with one single concept for experience and practice 
“because experience is linked to Bolivia‟s regional, social and cultural plurality” (Prada 
2011, 146). However, ethical and political dimensions can propose a new view of society 
based on pluralism.  Ecuador‟s political contestation in the year 2006 based on different 
factions and movements and its consolidation in the 2008 Magna Carta are perfect 
examples of this type of diverse society. 
By establishing a historical contextualization of indigenous movements and their 
stance on development, it is clear that these movements have become more visible in the 
political dimension.  In particular, the Ecuadorian case requires further analysis on the 
degree of participation these movements have had.  On the one hand, the 1998 constitution 
had been historically considered a text that contributed and fostered certain concessions 
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rather than a political charter that addressed the rights and needs of the most impoverished. 
On the other hand, “constitutional lawyers view Ecuador‟s 2008 constitution as offering a 
model that overturns twentieth century European social democratic states, by moving 
deliberately beyond liberal citizenship” (Radcliffe 2012, 243). Other forms of 
constitutional models, which held the maximum categorization, placed individual rights 
under a lower stratum compared to property rights. 
The 2008 constitution presents itself as “intercultural” and “plurinational” to the 
extent that it transforms the link between citizens and their territory in three fundamental 
ways:  
(1) A multicultural society that respects and promotes unity, equality, and solidarity among 
all peoples and nationalities, regardless of cultural differences.  
(2) The refoundation of the state to overcome the monocultural national identity premised 
upon European norms. 
(3) Plurinationalism commits the state to an agenda broader than poverty alleviation, as it 
encompasses the recognition of indigenous and black territories and indigenous forms of 
justice (Radcliffe 2011, 244).  
Vanhulst and Beling assert this new change in plurinationality breaks from western 
ideologies.  In a way, plurinationality “performs a dual role as critique of European 
modernity, on the one hand, and as a proposal for cultural social and political renewal on 
the other. It includes the idea of interdependence between society and its natural 
environment and a conception of the universal a plural reality” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 
56). Having distinctive roles due to different types of citizenship becomes innovative only 
to the extent where structure is changed to favor these roles, and it does not only fall into a 
new constitutional category.   
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Radcliffe illustrates the concept of differentiated citizenship.  According to the 
author, the BV seeks to overcome  
The liberal false dichotomy, between individual and collective rights in legislative and practical 
ways…in which citizens and their claims and rights are organized around the lines of cultural and 
social differentiation that exist, rather than around the requirement that all citizens be the same 
(Radcliffe 2011, 242).  
Additionally, Severine Deneulin cites Deborah Yashar in a term she has coined as “post 
liberal challenge” where indigenous movements have “created a situation where different 
understandings of citizenship have to co-exist with each other in a state unified by a 
common national identity”. This has created an insolvable challenge or task in which  
“indigenous people demand to be citizens of Ecuador the indigenous way, recognizing 
communal ownership on land and relationship of reverence and reciprocity towards nature, 
but at the same time, they cannot be such citizens without being Ecuadorian citizens first 
with a common citizenship” (Deneulin 2012, 5). This challenge is a hard task to convey for 
the state due to the fact the its highly dependent of an extractive industry, which in turn 
violates rights of the people that live on that land, unfolding on a controversy of rights.   
 As an alternative to development, Prada explains that the Buen Vivir unfolds on 
three premises. (A) Development is no longer single or universal but plural: it is 
understood to be comprehensive, able to address situations that are not homogenous. (B) 
Development is no longer merely a quantitative aim, but a qualitative process. It must 
consider the community‟s enjoyment of material goods and subjective, spiritual, and 
intellectual realization. (C) The accumulation of wealth and industrialization are no longer 
the aims of a desirable future, but are the means for attaining the harmonious co-existence 
between communities. (D) The focus on the individual gives way to co-existence, 
interaction, and intercultural dialogue (Prada, 2011, 148-149). This premise can be 
exemplified in the “Plan National del Buen Vivir” published in 2010 in which “buen vivir 
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and development are understood as interchangeable. Development is the realization of 
buen vivir, and the construction and realization of buen vivir is what enables this new 
vision of human and social development” (Walsh 2010, 19). Development still is a word 
that resonates in state objectives, which may be based on different values but perpetrates 
the idea of a state on path towards a certain place.   
The role of the state under the Buen Vivir realm is to ensure the reproduction of its 
population without harming the regeneration of natural biodiversity (Prada 2011, 147). In 
addition, Walsh determines that “development is conceived in the context of the State; that 
is to say, development is the strategy by which state reform will occur, permitting the State 
to recuperate its capacities of management, planning, regulation, and redistribution. In this 
sense buen vivir as development is the State” (Walsh 2010, 20).  Prada affirms the 
restructuration of a plurinationalist state is structured as a two way process: “first, 
transferring competencies from central government to the departments, municipalities and 
autonomous indigenous territories; and second, by transferring competencies from the 
bottom up, from community organizations to the regional authorities” (Prada 2011, 150). 
As a result it is important to say that any lateral form of organization and mode of relation 
among citizens that is carried without the state is not considered as Buen Vivir. There is a 
high dependency on the role the state has due to the attributes the constitutions confers to it 
and in the same way due to the ambiguity in defining the Buen Vivir (allowing 
instrumental exploitation of the term).  
One big question for Ecuador is still unanswered. How can Ecuador shift from a 
plural economy, based on capitalist mode of production and relations in a world capitalist 
economy, to a social economy where solidarity is the higher value? According to Prada, 
Ecuador must leave the current economic structure based on extractive raw material 
procedures to the industrialization of strategic natural resources. This process is a difficult 
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task due the high dependency the economy has to natural resources and the low private 
investment it has to generate jobs. Acknowledging the previous the author believes that 
this can be accomplished through the transformation of the productive matrix:  
(1) The expansion of an interventionist state, so that it takes active part in the productive 
apparatus.  
(2) The industrialization of natural resources in order to overcome the dependence on raw 
material exports.  
(3) The modernization and technological upgrading of small and medium rural and urban 
production.  
(4) The state as a redistributor and reinvestor of the economic surplus.  
(5) Priority to satisfy the domestic market 
 (6) Recognition and promotion of those involved in the community economy as being 
credit-worthy and subject of rights (Prada 2011, 154-155).  
Here again, the economic structure based on extractive raw material is accomplished 
within the sole role of the state. The change of structure can only be accomplished if raw 
materials can be left aside as one of the primary exports of the nation, which can be a 
several decade‟s process. 
 The Buen Vivir‟s economic exchanges “are submitted not to the logic of profits but 
to the logic of human flourishing and respect of nature. Solidarity becomes the basic value 
of the economic system. This means that material goods are to be produced and exchanged 
in view of enabling people to live in dignity and sustaining harmonious relations between 
people and their environment” (Deneulin, 2012, 3). Radcliffe argues “currently Ecuador 
development relies highly on exports of petroleum (and to the lesser extent gas), migrants‟ 
remittances and agricultural exports (the major ones beings bananas, shrimp, and cacao)”.  
Therefore, if there were to be a change in the productive matrix and a shift in communal 
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economy, “these forms of development entail enormous environmental and socio-
ecological externalities that have never been systematically calculated or taken into 
account” and should be analyzed responsibly” (Radcliffe, 2011, 241). Inserting values that 
replace the capitalist way of production and relation means changing the way we have 
come to think about prosperity and wellbeing for many years.   
El Buen Vivir and Its Relation to Development Paradigms 
 It is imperative to understand the extent to which the Buen Vivir is different from 
modern development theories and capitalist ideologies before responding whether it can be 
a viable alternative to development per se. Deneulin‟s Human Development Policy does 
not question the structure of production and is outcome-oriented, not process-oriented. 
Moreover, human development follows the same logic because the high development 
achievers set the goal for others, in this case other countries, to catch up on a linear mode” 
(Deneulin 2012, 8-9). In contrast, the Buen Vivir “breaks away from the reductionist 
Cartesian worldview to adopt a systemic perspective encompassing the entire ecosphere” 
(Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 56), where development “relying just on the capitalist market 
is viewed as socially unjust and unsustainable, premised on scarcity and resulting in 
policy‟s narrow focus on poverty alleviation” (Radcliffe 2011, 242). This duality of a 
Cartesian world corresponds to the initial moment of separation of what is considered as 
political and apolitical, hence between human and nature.   
The importance of Nature in the BV discourse has its foundations in the Sumak Kawsay 
cosmovision, but at the same time in the connection with transnational and ecologic 
movements of the time. Hence Sustainable Development (SD), arises from the 
“hybridization of social development and ecological theories… since the late 1960s, given 
the growing evidence of human responsibility in global environmental change, debates on 
the relationship between development and the environment increased” (Beling and 
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Vanhulst 2014, 54).  Moreover, throughout the last decades, indicators such as The Human 
Development Index, the Measuring Progress Initiative and the Better Life Index, to 
mention a few, have started to see development under distinct perspectives. Deneulin 
concludes, “unlike these initiatives, buen vivir does not seek to measure progress 
differently. It rejects a linear notion of progress altogether, and even proposes a 
moratorium on the word development” (Deneulin 2012, 7). This differs greatly from what 
Walsh earlier exemplifies as development through the state, at sets forward the clear 
distance between the ethos of Sumak Kawsay and the Buen Vivir discourse. Hence, it has 
to be contrasted that although its ethos rejects the word development, the buen vivir 
discourse emphasizes the realization of development through the state as the precursor of 
change, as the good living that is sought in the constitution.  
Integral and sustainable development, which have their roots on the contributions 
of Manfred Max- Neef and Amartya Sen, focus on the subject, rather than having an 
object. This refers to the special focus on personal attributes and circumstances to define 
development. Walsh elaborates and asserts that this form of development is based on 
“equity, democracy, participation, protection of bio-diversity and natural resources, and 
respect for ethnic-cultural diversity” (Walsh 2010, 16). Unfortunately, sustainable 
development has not been able to overcome the criticism it stirred decades ago.  Vanhulst 
and Beling argue the following:  
Sharp inconsistencies resulting from the diverse forms of articulation and appropriation have thus 
far prevented it from overcoming certain normative and practical limits and this from achieving its 
central goal, namely to allow for the satisfaction of the needs of all human beings…without 
jeopardizing the possibility of future generations (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 58).  
The buen vivir reconciles some of the major critiques that SD has over development but 
differs greatly in the fact that it does articulate a path to change and corrects such 
criticisms, as will be further explained.   
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Buen Vivir seeks to elevate the condition of nature to that of a subject of rights, and 
this makes it “bio-centric and ethically relational. There is no separation between human 
life and the environment, and human lives cannot be separated from each other” (Deneulin 
2012, 9). Furthermore, Buen Vivir can be contrasted to the sustainable development 
discursive field since it “looks at the relationship of mutual dependence between humans 
and their natural environment in a specific manner. On the other hand, however, it requires 
overcoming the society/nature dualism, typical of European modernity” (Beling and 
Vanhulst 2014, 58). However, the direct connection that Buen Vivir has with the 
development academia is the opposite. Although for Thomson, for example, the use of 
contemporary science and the indigenous cosmovision can be a worthwhile connection. 
Thomson believes that this fusion is “a synthesis, of elements of sometimes overly holistic 
indigenous wisdom and of excessively compartmentalized western science [which] provide 
guidance for a way out of the current crisis which threatens the planet” (Thomson 2014, 
451). In other words, the author argues that the Buen Vivir as a rambling discourse that is 
construed by different standpoints serves as plausible change only if this alternative is 
combined with science.   
According to Vanhulst and Beling, the BV is different from other contemporary 
discourses. Most of these modern discussions are “aimed at transforming the forms of 
social organization and currently prevailing production and consumption patterns in order 
to make them compatible with the (social and ecological) sustainability imperative” 
(Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 61).  Moreover, “the fact remains that 25 years after the 
canonization of SD, the controversies that gave rise to it remain virtually untouched, and 
the irruption of BV in the global debates about society and environment aims to 
contributing to re-contextualize our collective thinking about the socio-economic and 
ecological drifts of the development project” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 59). It is clear the 
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emergence of Buen Vivir relates in certain aspects to sustainable development insofar it 
promotes the search of a higher ideal of sustainability, and by trying to eliminate the dual 
Cartesian view of nature and men, it sets forward an important step in searching for 
alternatives.    
Analyzing the BV as a Counter-hegemonic movement 
 In the initial chapter, Robert Cox‟s theory was exemplified to elaborate on a 
framework from which to understand hegemony.  After illustrating the various ways in 
which the development project through modernity and capitalism came to create the 
current hegemonic bloc, the Buen Vivir was introduced. The latter corresponds to erosion 
in the current development paradigm insofar that it perpetrates its main critiques and 
creates a potentiality to conceive society and the state in different ways. Ergo, after 
considering several of the aspects that conform the discursive field that emanates from the 
indigenous cosmovision, it is clear the framework from the initial chapter can further 
scrutinize this discourse and formulate a comprehensive response as to whether the BV 
stands as a counter hegemonic movement and an alternative to development. 
Passive Revolution 
Gramsci distinguished between two kinds of societies: one that has undergone a 
thorough social revolution, and, another, which imports the model of an external 
revolution.  Wallerstein claims the former can be found in the industrial revolution, which 
“was accompanied by a very strong current of thought which defined this change as both a 
process of organic development and of progress” (Wallerstein 1979, 195). In a current 
perspective, the “indigenous struggles continue. They are not demanding that their lives, 
their health and livelihoods, or that their indigenous identity and way of life be recognized 
by the state, but that a new economic, moral, social and political order be established” 
47 
 
(Deneulin 2012, 6).  In this case, Cox claims the current situation has brought forward a 
revolution that demands changes or change in the relations of hegemony. 
 Radcliffe asserts this demand for change in the relations between State and the 
indigenous class in Ecuador is the response of a “highly politicized” process.  This is due 
not only as a contestation to neoliberal development projects, but to the fact that 
conceptualizing, defining, and implementing an indigenous cosmovision into western 
canons of society is not an easy task. The revolution that can be traced to the early 
indigenous movements in the 1960‟s, when the indigenous were considered peasants, and 
that in the 1900s gained momentum in the national arena, mark a reconciliation by 
including the Buen Vivir in the constitution.  The Buen Vivir in the national constitution 
gives the indigenous people potential new space in the political sphere. The 2008 elections 
mark a historical moment, to which the “constitution provisions were elaborated in the 
context of sustained electoral support for anti-neoliberal measures in combination with a 
tense relationship between government and social movements” (Radcliffe 2011, 245).  
For the purpose of pointing out changes in Ecuador, and the actors that are 
responsible of these changes, is to talk about a social revolution in the electoral rally for 
2006. The current president of Ecuador emphasizes, “the buen vivir constitution is the 
outcome of a citizen‟s revolution, as if indigenous people mobilized as individual citizens 
to secure their individual rights” (Deneulin 2012, 5). Consequently, Radcliffe points out 
that “soon after the 2008 constitution was ratified in referendum, CONAIE and other 
indigenous confederations left president Correa‟s coalition government, pointing to the 
government‟s retreat from key plurinational and intercultural measures in political 
discourse and practice” (Radcliffe 2011, 246). These two examples confirm a social group 
can carry out a revolution, but not to it‟s fully extent to generate the desired changes. In 
this case, Alianza País was an absolute winner for the 2006 electoral campaign that 
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postulated Correa as President. Cox speaks of a bloc formation when “a subordinate class 
(e.g., the workers) establishes its hegemony over the subordinate groups (e.g., small 
farmers, marginal)” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 132).  In this case, indigenous movements can 
be considered a subordinate group rather than a class.  
Marisol de La Cadena in “Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes” refers to the 
electoral results in Bolivia and Ecuador.  According to Cadena, these results are considered 
to be a “continental re-turn to the left, but what is unprecedented is the presence of regional 
indigenous social movements as a constituent element of these transformations” (Cadena 
2010, 334-335). She also asserts the “same reasoning does not apply in Ecuador…as well 
as the inscription of Nature of Pachamama in the Constitution occurred despite the 
electoral defeat of Luis Macas, the 2006 indigenous candidate to the Ecuadorian 
Presidency” (Ibidem).  In this way, the Sumak Kawsay becomes a useful tool for creating 
inclusion among different members of the political rally.  Thus, Andrew Deak claims, “if 
hegemony is based on consent and effective inclusion of subaltern groups, the counter-
hegemony would emerge from the contradictions of a non-hegemonic period” (Deak 2005, 
50). This period of contradictions is the one mentioned earlier, as a crisis in the neoliberal 
institutions that set the conditions for change and emersion of new actors. 
 Indeed, it is possible for several political groups to share interests.  This is the case 
for supporting anti-neoliberal measures, which entered a crisis during the hegemonic 
period before the consolidation of Alianza País, and which introduced the Buen Vivir 
discourse. The indigenous cosmovision reproduces itself as a discursive practice of power 
only to justify the current hegemon  “which brings the interests of the leading class into 
harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an 
ideology expressed in universal terms” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 133). Hence, the leading 
class Alianza País in the 2008 elections joined subordinate groups with the Buen Vivir 
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common ideology.  Just as Cox states in his work, this shared ideology is an organic 
commitment that responds to a hegemonic level of consciousness. 
 
 
Transformismo 
 The process of BV as a passive revolution merges indigenous concepts into the 
elaboration of constitutional rights and sets forward an “alternative” developmental 
program.  The result is transformismo and co-optation as key elements in this process. 
Walsh asserts, “in a region by social movement resistance, insurgence, and demands, 
social inclusion and coexistence are considered useful tools in preventing ethnic 
balkanization and controlling and managing ethnic opposition, the latter considered an 
increasing threat to (trans) national security” (Walsh, 2010, 17). The social inclusion is the 
homogenization of political groups into the same vector or ideology, which finds its 
support in the constitution.  
Any possible group that may pose a threat to the consolidation of power of the 
hegemon must be domesticated and assembled in the line of the current ideology in power. 
Cox further states “by extension transformismo can serve as a strategy of assimilating and 
domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the 
dominant coalition” (Cox and Sinclair, 1983, 130). He later concludes   “ideologies will be 
universal in form, i.e., they will not appear as those of a particular class, and will give 
some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership of vital 
interests of the hegemonic class” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 133). The Buen Vivir fosters the 
role of the state, converting it as the strongest actor in the nation, and when the time comes 
for social movements to interact with it, their demands have a high probability to be co-
opted under the current logic of power.  Deneulin claims “buen vivir risks being reduced to 
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a set of statistical targets to be met by a certain date, or being assimilated to human 
development” (Deneulin 2012, 9).  Along the same line, Deneulin categorizes Buen Vivir 
as “a matter of providing health, education and basic services without allowing forms of 
life which are incompatible with a liberal democratic political system and a capitalist 
economy to exist” (Ibidem).  
Due to the distance between the ethos and the praxis of the BV discourse, and not 
considering the even longer distance between BV and the origins of Sumak Kawsay, it is 
clear the concept is ambiguous.  The concepts of nature, reciprocity, and solidarity are not 
defined and become hard to contextualize in daily life because these concepts belong to a 
different society, an indigenous society. Under this premise, Vanhulst and Beling assert” 
semantic contours make BV vulnerable to instrumental exploitation or cooptation with the 
purpose of legitimizing political decisions and socio-economic configurations clearly alien 
to this ethos” (Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 60). Cox relates to the formulation of enduring 
commitments, so hegemony can be established in universal terms. Furthermore, he quotes 
Gramsci to explain the relevance of the term organic: “organize human masses, and create 
the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position…these are 
contrasted with ideas that are merely arbitrary” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 101). The Buen 
Vivir then, is highly subject to transformation in order to serve political purposes; its 
organic character depends on the ambiguity of the concept itself, allowing it to be used for 
political exploitation.  
The ambiguity in the BV discourse can empower the state to determine and 
argument the considerations needed to achieve certain outcomes. This relates to Cox‟s idea 
of “comprehensive concept of control,” in which the Buen Vivir as the State is “a 
condensation of a hegemonic relationship between dominant classes and class 
fractions…leading class develops a hegemonic project…which transcends particular 
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economic corporate interests and becomes capable of binding and cohering the diverse 
aspirations and general interests of various social classes” (Bieler and Morton 1983, 92). 
This umbrella is magnified under the definition of the Buen Vivir discourse and its 
objective to “include those historically excluded from capitalist markets and those reliant 
on forms of production and reproduction with different logics to the market and thereby 
introduces measures to reduce economic and social exclusion” (Radcliffe 2011, 242).  
The latter argument is clearly an argumentation from the ethos point of view of the 
discourse.  Moreover, it is contested in the example of language and forms of production of 
indigenous segments that the praxis falls short. In the first place, state policies “continue to 
include clear targets regarding increase in oil production…none of the objectives include 
indigenous demands of recognition of collective ownership of land on their territory, their 
specific form of public authority and autonomy” (Deneulin 2012, 9). The previous chapter 
elaborates on the multiple forms the state tries to contemplate citizenship and rights that 
emanate from nature.  However, in daily practice, the state continues to reproduce 
postcolonial forms of power organization.  
 In the constitution an important recognition to the instauration of Kichwa and Shuar 
as official languages in combination with Spanish to propagate a better and more 
expansive intercultural immersion with the state. Nevertheless, as Radcliffe points out, 
“this measure did not require Spanish-speaking citizens to learn an indigenous language. 
The normative status of Spanish thereby remains in place, with a concession made to non-
Spanish speakers in areas where indigenous languages are widely spoken” (Radcliffe 2011, 
247). Vanhulst and Beling contribute with the idea that “even if the discourse of respect for 
and worthiness of cultural differences has become indispensable…political decisions rarely 
emerge from popular and communal proposals, but rather from standardized repertoire of 
best practices fitting the mainstream discourse of development” (Beling and Vanhulst 
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2014, 59). These practices justify the cooption of cultural difference under the state logic 
to maintain development discourses.  
 
 
Forming a Blocco Historico/Hegemony 
 For Cox to discuss hegemony and the construction of a Historic Bloc, it is first 
necessary to discuss a revolution, where “it not only modifies the internal economic and 
political structures of the state in question but also unleashed energies, which expand 
beyond the state boundaries” (Cox and Sinclair 1983, 136-137).  In the second chapter, by 
analyzing the hegemony of the United States, it becomes clear that capitalism, as an 
ideological vector that promotes production and consumption under the premise that 
development is the road to prosperity continues to be the current mode of relation. Gilbert 
Rist points out that social relations are “not free from the rule of commodity and 
exploitation-that is, from exchange-value determined by supply and demand” (Rist 2010, 
15). The Buen Vivir as an alternative paradigm to development must seek to change the 
way we see development under certain parameters that are not predominant to social 
relations.  
 The Buen Vivir pursues complementary economic activity with nature, the latter 
being subject to Constitutional rights that guarantee its preservation. Unfortunately, 
regarding BV canons and political charters that enunciate and preserve Nature‟s rights, the 
reality has been far away from the heart of the whole discourse. To illustrate the point, 
countries like Bolivia and Ecuador according to Vanhulst and Beling suggest that both 
nations “increasingly resemble textbook illustrations of neo-extractive economic agendas”. 
For example, “the administrations of President Correa in Ecuador and President Morales in 
Bolivia are currently following a pathway of economic development that reinforces well-
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worn (neo) extractivist practices (mainly oil exploitation but also large-scale mining)” 
(Beling and Vanhulst 2014, 60). The presence of a high dependency on natural resources is 
an element that has haunted developing countries from its early years, which in turn only 
respond to the capitalist structure itself.   
 Subsequently, national interests of resource exploitation and the rights of people 
who live in the area are in constant conflict. Radcliffe explains, “indigenous 
representatives are not granted direct representation in all state bodies, and their rights over 
extractive industries established only a right to prior, free and informed consultation” 
(Radcliffe 2011, 246). Hence, the state is the sole promoter and protector of decisions that 
require citizen consultation, even though it is a “plurinational state”. Furthermore, public 
policies have sought to  
Include clear targets regarding increase in oil production, metal mining and passenger air 
transportation. Ironically the constitution that “makes a grand case for buen vivir, also claims that 
mining decisions are not subject to the consent or veto of indigenous people, because the indigenous 
only have consultative power (Deneulin 2012, 5).  
 Changes in mode of production accompanied by ideology can clearly foster change 
in how the hegemon is structured. Clearly according to Cox‟s theory, “changes in the 
social relations of production give rise to new configurations of social forces. State power 
rests on these configurations” (Bieler and Morton 2004, 89). Any change in hegemonic 
structure means a change in production relations. Wallerstein coins a term known as 
“Ethnic-consciousness”. This term has a distinctive meaning in periphery countries from 
those of the Core.  The reason for this difference is the following: 
Political struggles of ethno-nations or segments of classes within national boundaries of course are 
the daily bread and butter…but their significance or consequences can only be fruitfully analyzed if 
one spells out the implications of their organizational activity or political demands for the 
functioning of the world economy (Wallerstein 1979, 106).  
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This view emulates Cox‟s structuralist understanding. If the Buen Vivir discourse is a 
plausible alternative, it can change the economic relations that precede it. On the contrary, 
reality has differed greatly due to the fact that inserting alien cosmology in the Ecuadorian 
society, based on different principles, would mean a change of market, state and society.  
Many of the elements that seek to be changed still remain in place, and even some 
have been reinforced. Radcliffe claims “the state remains in practice of a colonial state, 
unwilling to cede autonomy and territorial rights to collective citizens…the government 
continues to interpret and prioritize certain constitutional principles over others in ways 
that serve to reproduce postcolonial hierarchies” (Radcliffe 2011, 248).  Similarly, 
Vanhulst and Beling conclude that the BV “unthinkingly reproduces a form of elite 
postcolonial modernity that continuously denigrates other ways of knowing and practicing 
development”.  Hence, there has not been a change in the mode of production.  In contrast, 
the current mode of production is a neo-extractivist agenda that denigrates indigenous 
rights and reproduces the same economic structure prior to the instauration of the BV in 
the constitution.   
The Buen Vivir as a public policy represents success for indigenous that have 
socially and politically worked for a recognition from the State. On the contrary, as a 
counter-hegemonic movement the lack of a social class which can exhibit the enough 
influence to change the modes of production is lacking. We are in presence of a type of 
Caesarism represented by a collective Intellectual who has been able to politically exploit 
the Buen Vivir for its own purpose. The logics of demand and supply are the mentality of 
western economics, any change based on reciprocity of solidarity is clearly alien to our 
system and means a change in the market. It has to be mentioned that establishing nature as 
a subject of rights in the constitution sets forward a first stance in the search for 
alternatives to the capitalist-destructive way of thinking.  
55 
 
Conclusions 
 The development concept has opened its boundaries for debates on several 
grounds, but the problems such as fostering capitalist modes of production, remain 
untouched. 
 The Sumak Kawsay concept is different from Buen Vivir in the form that the latter 
gains political rigidity to conceptualize an ideology that could be put into action. 
Hence, it is completely opposed to the tenets of the former, which dictate constant 
change.    
 Introducing alien cosmology into western society under constitutional rights 
demands a total transformation of the state, market, and society.  
 Under Robert Cox‟s concept of hegemony, the discussion of BV as a counter 
hegemonic movement includes three levels: 
- Passive Revolution: the leading class Alianza País in the 2008 elections 
summoned subordinate groups into the same ideology. As Cox states, 
the Buen Vivir was an organic commitment that responded to a 
hegemonic level of consciousness.  
- Transformismo: The BV fosters the role of the state, converting it in the 
strongest actor in the nation.  However, when the time comes for social 
movements to interact with the state, their demands have a high 
probability to be co-opted under the current logic of power (e.g., 
CONAIE).  
- Formation of a Historic Bloc: the state continues to portray a 
postcolonial modernity, conserving the current structure of power, 
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through a Collective Intellectual (Alianza País) in the practice of 
Caesarism. 
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